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Abstract We survey some recent research results in the ﬁeld of dynamic cooperative diﬀerential
games with non-transferable utilities. Problems which ﬁt into this framework occur for instance if a
person has more than one objective he likes to optimize or if several persons decide to combine eﬀorts
in trying to realize their individual goals. We assume that all persons act in a dynamic environment
and that no side-payments take place.
For these kind of problems the notion of Pareto eﬃciency plays a fundamental role. In economic
terms, an allocation in which no one can be made better-oﬀ without someone else becoming worse-
oﬀ is called Pareto eﬃcient. In this paper we present as well necessary as suﬃcient conditions for
existence of a Pareto optimum for general non-convex games. These results are elaborated for the
special case that the environment can be modeled by a set of linear diﬀerential equations and the
objectives can be modeled as functions containing just aﬃne quadratic terms. Furthermore we will
consider for these games the convex case.
In general there exists a continuum of Pareto solutions and the question arises which of these solu-
tions will be chosen by the participating persons. We will ﬂash some ideas from the axiomatic theory
of bargaining, which was initiated by Nash [16, 17], to predict the compromise the persons will reach.
Keywords : Dynamic Optimization, Pareto Eﬃciency, Cooperative Diﬀerential Games, LQ The-
ory, Riccati Equations, Bargaining
Jel-codes: C61, C71, C73.
1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the problem to ﬁnd an ”optimal” strategy in case either there is one
individual who has multiple objectives, or, there is more than one person aﬀecting a dynamic system
and in order to minimize their cost these persons decide to coordinate their actions. As an example
one can think of a government who likes to realize an acceptable income level, full-ﬂedged employment
for everyone, a just income distribution, a stable price level, a stable currency exchange rate, a
sustainable balance of payment, and a lasting economic growth. One can imagine that the realization
of all these goals simultaneously will be a tough or, more probably, impossible task. From that
perspective it is more realistic to classify all simultaneously feasible realizations of the objectives and
∗Corresponding author: Tilburg University; Dept. of Econometrics and O.R.; P.O. Box: 90153; 5000 LE Tilburg;
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1next let the government choose one of these options. An example illustrating a situation where more
than one player is involved in a game and the players cooperate in order to realize their objectives is
for instance the next advertising game (see [13]). Consider two competing divisions in a conglomerate
company which wish to maximize their individual proﬁts by choosing an optimal advertising policy.
Being divisions of a parent company, they are not out to ”hurt” each other. Therefore it seems
reasonable to assume that they will coordinate their policies in order to maximize their proﬁts.
The above examples are characterized by the fact that there is either one or more player who can
aﬀect the outcome of the state of a system. We will assume that the evolution of this system over
time is described by a diﬀerential equation. Since players simultaneously aﬀect the outcome of the
system the performance of the players depends on the actions taken by the other players. To realize
an outcome which is as good as possible for all of them simultaneously, we assume in this paper that
players decide to coordinate their actions and engage in a cooperative game. It is assumed that all
players can communicate and enter into binding agreements. However, no side-payments take place.
Moreover, it is assumed that every player has all information on as well the state dynamics as the
cost functions of his opponents, and all players are able to implement their decisions. In literature
this information structure is know as the open-loop information game. Concerning the strategies
used by the players we assume that there are no restrictions. That is, every control trajectory chosen
by player i, ui(.), may be chosen arbitrarily from a set U (which depends on the problem setting
and will be speciﬁed later) in order to have a well-posed problem. More formally, we consider the




gi(t,x(t),u1(t),u2(t))dt + hi(x(T)), i = 1,2, (1)
where x(t), is the solution of the diﬀerential equation
˙ x(t) = f(t,x(t),u1(t),u2(t)), x(t0) = x0. (2)
For the moment we do not explicitly state conditions on the functions gi and f and the set of control
actions U. We just assume that they are such that the above integrals are well-deﬁned and the
diﬀerential equation has a solution on [t0,T] in the extended sense (see e.g. [4], [12] or [5]). Later
on, when needed, additional assumptions will be made on these functions and set. Furthermore we
make the convention that in case we consider this problem for the initial time t0 = 0, we use the
shorthand notation J(u1,u2) instead of (1).
By cooperation, in general, the cost a speciﬁc player incurs is not uniquely determined anymore.
If, within the above two-player context, both players decide for instance to use their control variables
to minimize the performance of player 1 as much as possible, a diﬀerent minimum is attained for
player 1 than in case both players agree to help collectively player 2 to minimize his performance.
So, depending on how the players choose to ”divide” their control eﬀorts, a player incurs diﬀerent
”minima”. Therefore, in general, each player is confronted with a whole set of possible outcomes from
which somehow one outcome (which in general does not coincide with a player’s overall lowest cost)
is cooperatively selected. Now, if there are two control strategies u1 and u2 such that every player
has a lower cost if strategy u1 is played, then it seems reasonable to assume that all players will prefer
this strategy. We say that the solution induced by strategy u1 dominates the solution induced by the
strategy u2. So, dominance means that the outcome is better for all players. Proceeding in this line
of thinking it seems reasonable to consider only those cooperative outcomes which have the property
that, if a diﬀerent strategy than the one corresponding with this cooperative outcome is chosen then
2at least one of the players has higher costs. Or, stated diﬀerently, to consider only solutions that are
such that they can not be improved upon by all players simultaneously. This motivates the concept
of Pareto eﬃciency.
Deﬁnition 1.1 Let U denote the set of admissible strategies. A set of control actions ˆ u (in the
sequel: a control) is called Pareto eﬃcient if the set of inequalities
Ji(u) ≤ Ji(ˆ u), i = 1,    ,N,
where at least one of the inequalities is strict, does not allow for any solution u ∈ U. The corre-
sponding point (J1(ˆ u),    ,JN(ˆ u)) ∈ I RN is called a Pareto solution. The set of all Pareto solutions
is called the Pareto frontier. ￿
A Pareto solution is therefore never dominated, and for that reason called an undominated solution.
Usually there is more than one Pareto solution, because dominance is a property which generally
does not provide a total ordering. Lemma 2.1, below, gives a suﬃcient condition under which one
can conclude that a control is Pareto eﬃcient. This result is well-known in literature (see e.g. [13],
[5] or [31]). This lemma holds without using any convexity conditions on the J′
is nor any convexity
assumptions regarding the strategy space. Its converse, Theorem 2.12, was proved by Fan et al in
[9] under some convexity assumptions on the cost functions. This result was exploited in [7] to solve
the regular cooperative indeﬁnite linear quadratic game. In this paper we present in Section 2 for
general non-convex problems necessary conditions for a control to be Pareto eﬃcient and next discuss
additional conditions from which one can conclude that these necessary conditions are suﬃcient
too. As far as we know these conditions have not been stated explicitly in the literature. The
obtained results resemble the corresponding results for the static optimization problem as reported,
e.g., in [22]. Section 3 deals with the regular, non-convex, indeﬁnite ﬁnite-planning horizon linear
quadratic diﬀerential game. Most results are presented here for a ﬁnite planning horizon. In particular
we present here an algorithm to compute all Pareto eﬃcient solutions when the system is scalar.
Unfortunately, it remains unclear whether this algorithm can also be used for non-scalar systems
to ﬁnd all Pareto eﬃcient solutions. In Section 4 we consider the special case that both the set of
admissible control functions and cost functions are convex. We show that in that case the algorithm
presented in Section 3 can be used too to calculate all Pareto eﬃcient solutions as well in case the
planning horizon is ﬁnite as in case it is inﬁnite.
Assuming an open-loop information structure it seems reasonable that players will also make a
decision at the start of the planning horizon which Pareto eﬃcient control they will use. In section
5 we present a number of candidate solutions that are motivated from the axiomatic bargaining
literature. Section 6 concludes and mentions a number of open problems. This overview is to a
large extent based on results reported in [5], [6], [7] and [8]. This paper contains some more detailed
results and proofs.
2 The general case
In this section we ﬁrst present some preliminary results and properties about Pareto eﬃcient solutions
(frontier) which hold in general. After this, we present then the necessary conditions followed by a
discussion of some suﬃcient conditions.
3In the subsequent analysis the following set of parameters, A (the ”unit-simplex”), plays a crucial
role.




The following two lemmas provide a characterization of Pareto eﬃcient controls. To emphasize the
role of the assumptions, we include of both results a proof which is a straightforward copy of the
proof for the ﬁnite dimensional case (see e.g. [5] and [22]).
Lemma 2.1 Let αi ∈ (0,1), with
N  
i=1
αi = 1. Assume ˆ u ∈ U is such that






Then ˆ u is Pareto eﬃcient. ￿
Proof. Let αi ∈ (0,1), with
 N





αiJi(u)}. Assume ˆ u is not Pareto
eﬃcient. Then, there exists an N-tuple of strategies ¯ u such that
Ji(¯ u) ≤ Ji(ˆ u), i = 1,    ,N,







which contradicts the fact that ˆ u is minimizing. ￿
Lemma 2.2 ˆ u ∈ U is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if for each i ˆ u(.) minimizes Ji on the constrained
set
Ui := {u | Jj(u) ≤ Jj(ˆ u), j = 1,    ,N, j  = i}, for i = 1,    ,N. (4)
Proof. ” ⇒ ” Suppose ˆ u is Pareto eﬃcient. If ˆ u does not minimize Jk on the constrained set Uk
for some k, then there exists a u such that Jj(u) ≤ Jj(ˆ u) for all j  = k and Jk(u) < Jk(ˆ u). This
contradicts the Pareto eﬃciency of ˆ u.
” ⇐ ” Suppose ˆ u minimizes each Jk on Uk. If ˆ u does not provide a Pareto optimum, then there exists
a u(.) ∈ U and an index k such that Ji(u) ≤ Ji(ˆ u) for all i and Jk(u) < Jk(ˆ u). This contradicts the
minimality of ˆ u for Jk on Ck. ￿
A direct consequence of this lemma is that in the two-player case the Pareto frontier can be, loosely
speaking, visualized as a decreasing function.
4Corollary 2.3 (N = 2) Assume that the Pareto frontier consists of more than one point. If both ˆ u
and ˜ u are two Pareto eﬃcient controls with J1(ˆ u) ≤ J1(˜ u), then J2(ˆ u) ≥ J2(˜ u).
Proof. Assume that ˆ u and ˜ u are two Pareto eﬃcient controls with J1(ˆ u) ≤ J1(˜ u). Let ˆ U1 :=
{u | J1(u) ≤ J1(ˆ u)} and ˜ U1 := {u | J1(u) ≤ J1(˜ u)}. Then, according Lemma 2.2, J2(u) ≥ J2(ˆ u),
∀u ∈ ˆ U1 and, (i), J2(u) ≥ J2(˜ u), ∀u ∈ ˜ U1. Next notice that ˆ u ∈ ˜ U1. From (i) it follows then directly
that in particular J2(ˆ u) ≥ J2(˜ u). ￿
Corollary 2.4 Assume U is such that with ui(.) ∈ U, i = 1,2 also any concatenation of ui(.) belongs
to U. That is for every t0 we have that with u[0,t0) := u1[0,t0), u[t0,T] := u1[t0,T], u ∈ U.
If ˆ u[0,T] is a Pareto eﬃcient control for x(0) = x0 in (1,2), then for any t0 > 0, ˆ u[t0,T] is a Pareto
eﬃcient control for x(t0) = ˆ x(t0) in (1,2). Here ˆ x(t0) = x(t,0, ˆ u[0,t0]) is the value of the state at
time t0 induced by ˆ u[0,t0].
Proof. Consider for x(0) = x0 (see (4))
U1(0) := {u | J2(u) ≤ J2(ˆ u[0,T])}. (5)
Let t0 > 0. We will next show (see Lemma 2.2) that ˆ u[t0,T] minimizes J1(t0,u) on the constrained
set
˜ U1(t0) := {u | J2(u) ≤ J2(t0, ˆ u[t0,T]), subject to (30) with x(t0) = ˆ x(t0). (6)
To that end we ﬁrst note that ˆ u[t0,T] ∈ ˜ U1(t0).
Next we show that every element u ∈ ˜ U1(t0) can be viewed as an element ue ∈ U1(0) restricted to
the time interval [t0,T]. That is, ∀u ∈ ˜ U1(t0) there exists ue ∈ U1(0) such that ue[t0,T] = u. For,


















g2(t, ˆ x(t), ˆ u(t))dt +
  T
t0
g2(t, ˆ x(t), ˆ u(t))dt + h2(ˆ x(T))
= J2(ˆ u).
So, by deﬁnition, ue ∈ U1(0).
From the dynamic programming principle it follows now directly that ˆ u[t0,T] has to minimize J1(t0,u)
on ˜ U1(t0).
In the same way one can show that ˆ u[t0,T] also minimizes J2(t0,u) on the corresponding constrained
set ˜ U2(t0), which proves the claim. ￿
Corollary 2.5 Assume J1(u) has a minimum which is uniquely attained at ˆ u. Then (J1(ˆ u),    ,JN(ˆ u))
is a Pareto solution.
5Proof. Using the notation of Lemma 2.2 it follows directly from the fact that the minimum of J1(u)
is uniquely attained at ˆ u that Ui = {ˆ u}, for i = 2,    ,N. Furthermore, it is clear that ˆ u ∈ U1.
Consequently, minu∈Ui Ji = Ji(ˆ u), i = 2,    ,N and, since J1(u) ≥ J1(ˆ u) for arbitrary u, minu∈U1 J1(u) =
J1(ˆ u) too. Lemma 2.2 yields then the advertized result. ￿
Remark 2.6 From Lemma 2.1 it follows now that in case Ji(u) has a unique minimum location for
all i, then every control such that for some αi ∈ [0,1], with
N  
i=1
αi = 1, ˆ u ∈ argminu∈U{
 N
i=1 αiJi(u)}
is Pareto eﬃcient. ￿
Lemma 2.7 (N = 2) Assume α1 < α2 and ˆ ui ∈ U is such that
ˆ ui ∈ argmin
u∈U
{αiJ1(u) + (1 − αi)J2(u)}, i = 1,2. (7)
Then, for all α ∈ (α1,α2) there exists a ¯ J(α) such that for all u
αJ1(u) + (1 − α)J2(u) ≥ ¯ J(α). (8)
Proof. Note that
αJ1(u) + (1 − α)J2(u) =
α − α1
α2 − α1
(α2J1(u) + (1 − α2)J2(u)) +
α2 − α
α2 − α1




(α2J1(ˆ u2) + (1 − α2)J2(ˆ u2)) +
α2 − α
α2 − α1
(α1J1(ˆ u1) + (1 − α1)J2(ˆ u1)).
￿
Using Lemma 2.2 we derive next our main result on necessary conditions for a Pareto solution. For
that purpose we impose some additional smoothness conditions on our functions. Furthermore we
will for simplicity assume that U consists of the set of piecewise continuous functions1.
Assumption 2.8 Assume that
(i) f(t,x,u) and gi(t,x,u) are continuous functions on I R1+n+m. Moreover, for both f and gi all
partial derivatives w.r.t. x and u exist and are continuous.
(ii) hi(x) is continuously diﬀerentiable. ￿
Theorem 2.9 Let Assumptions 2.8 be satisﬁed. Assume (J1(ˆ u),J2(ˆ u)) is a Pareto solution for
problem (1,2). Then, there exists an α ∈ [0,1], a costate function λT(t) : [0,T] → I Rn (which is
continuous and piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable) such that, with H(t,x,u,λ) := αg1(t,x,u) +
(1 − α)g2(t,x,u) + λf(t,x,u), ˆ u satisﬁes
H(t, ˆ x(t), ˆ u(t),λ(t)) ≤ H(t, ˆ x(t),u(t),λ(t)), at each t ∈ [0,T], (9)
˙ λ(t) = −[α
∂g1
∂x







∂(αh1 + (1 − α)h2)
∂x
, (10)
˙ ˆ x(t) = f(t, ˆ x(t), ˆ u1(t), ˆ u2(t)), ˆ x(0) = x0. (11)
1see e.g. [12] (or [5, p.134]) for a generalization.
6Proof. Introduce the state variable ˙ x2 := g2(t,x,u), x2(0) = 0, and x∗
2 :=
  T
0 g2(t, ˆ x, ˆ u)dt+h2(ˆ x(T)),






























has a solution. From the maximum principle we conclude next (see e.g. [20] and [21, p.61]) that
there exist (continuous, piecewise continuously diﬀerentiable) costate functions λi(t) and a constant
p1 ∈ {0,1} (with [p1,λ1(t), λ2(t)]  = [0,0,0] for all t ∈ [0,T] (i)) such that the Hamiltonian H1 :=
p1g1(t,x,u)+λ1(t)f(t,x,u)+λ2(t)g2(t,x,u) is minimized at u = ˆ u. Furthermore the costate variables
satisfy the set of diﬀerential equations:

























where α1 ≥ 0, and α1(x2(T) + h2(x(T)) − x∗
2) = 0.
Since H1
x2 = 0, it follows that λ2(t) = α1, for all t ∈ [0,T]. Substitution of this into the ”ﬁrst-order”
condition of H1, gives then
p1g1(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) + λ1(t)f(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) + α1g2(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) ≤ p1g1(t, ˆ x,u) + λ1(t)f(t, ˆ x,u) + α1g2(t, ˆ x,u), t ∈ [0,T].
(13)





























has a solution, where x∗
1 :=
  T
0 g1(t, ˆ x, ˆ u)dt + h1(ˆ x(T)). Analogously as before one obtains then
from the necessary conditions the existence of an α2 ≥ 0, a costate function  1(t) and a constant
p2 ∈ {0,1} that satisfy:
α2g1(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) + p2g2(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) +  1(t)f(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) ≤ α2g1(t, ˆ x,u) + p2g2(t, ˆ x,u) +  1(t)f(t, ˆ x,u), t ∈ [0,T],(14)














Adding (13) and (14) yields
(p1 + α2)g1(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) + (p2 + α1)g2(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) + (λ1(t) +  1(t))f(t, ˆ x, ˆ u) ≤ (16)
(p1 + α2)g1(t, ˆ x,u) + (p2 + α1)g2(t, ˆ x,u) + (λ1(t) +  1(t))f(t, ˆ x,u).
7Addition of λ1(t) from (12) to  1(t) from (15) shows that ˜ λ(t) := λ1(t) +  1(t) satisﬁes
˙ ˜ λ(t) = −[(p1 + α2)
∂g1
∂x






]; ˜ λ(T) = (p1 + α2)h
′
1 + (p2 + α1)h
′
2. (17)
Next notice that if p1 = α1 = 0 it follows straightforwardly from (12) that λ1(t) = λ2(t) = p1 = 0,
which violates the maximum principle condition (i). So either p1 or α1 diﬀers from zero (and sim-
ilarly either p2 or α2 is larger than zero too). Therefore p1 + p2 + α1 + α2 > 0. Introducing ﬁnally
α :=
p1+α2
p1+p2+α1+α2 and λ(t) :=
˜ λ(t)
p1+p2+α1+α2, one obtains directly by division of (16) and (17) by
p1 + p2 + α1 + α2 the conditions (9-11). ￿
Remark 2.10 Notice that the above necessary conditions in Theorem 2.9 are closely related to the
minimization of
αJ1 + (1 − α)J2 subject to (30). (18)
By considering the Hamiltonian for this problem H := αJ1 + (1 − α)J2 + λf, we obtain from the
maximum principle in particular the conditions stated in Theorem 2.9. Unfortunately the maximum
principle conditions just provide necessary conditions. So, in case all conditions from Theorem 2.9
are met, we still can not conclude (in general) that problem (18) will have a solution. ￿
Remark 2.11 From the proof of Theorem 2.9 it is clear that without any complications one can
also consider problem (1,2) subject to inequality constraints mj(x(t),u1(t),u2(t)) ≤ 0, where mj is
continuously diﬀerentiable in all its arguments, j = 1,    ,k,. By restricting the set of admissible
controls to those for which these inequalities are satisﬁed and under the assumption that the con-
straint qualiﬁcation2 is met, the following necessary conditions result.
Assume (J1(ˆ u),J2(ˆ u)) is a Pareto solution for this problem. Then, there exists an α ∈ [0,1], a
(continuous and piecewise continously diﬀerentiable) costate function λT(t) : [0,T] → I Rn and (con-
tinuous) nonnegative Lagrange parameters  i(t) such that, with the Hamiltonian H as in Theorem
2.9, ˆ u satisﬁes
H(t, ˆ x(t), ˆ u(t),λ(t)) ≤ H(t, ˆ x(t),u(t),λ(t)), at each t ∈ [0,T] for all (19)

















˙ λ(t) = −[α
∂g1
∂x














∂(αh1 + (1 − α)h2)
∂x
;
˙ ˆ x(t) = f(t, ˆ x(t), ˆ u1(t), ˆ u2(t)), x(0) = x0. (22)
 j(t) ≥ 0;  j(t)mj(ˆ x(t), ˆ u1(t), ˆ u2(t)) = 0; mj(ˆ x(t), ˆ u1(t), ˆ u2(t)) ≤ 0. (23)
￿
2The most convenient constraint qualiﬁcation is the following rank condition. If p of the inequalities are satisﬁed
with equality then the matrix of partial derivatives of these p constraints w.r.t. u(t) must have rank p.
8Next we proceed with the derivation of some suﬃcient conditions for a control function to be Pareto
eﬃcient. The ﬁrst well-known result (see e.g. [5, Theorem 6.4]) states that under convexity assump-
tions on the performance functions one can derive all Pareto eﬃcient controls from the minimization
of the parametrized optimal control problem (18). This property will be exploited in Section 4 to
obtain for a speciﬁc class of linear quadratic diﬀerential games both necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tions for existence of Pareto eﬃcient controls.
Theorem 2.12 If U is convex3 and Ji(u) is convex for all i = 1,    ,N, then for all Pareto eﬃcient
ˆ u there exist α ∈ A, such that






The next result gives suﬃcient conditions under which one can conclude from a solution of (9-11)
that it will be Pareto eﬃcient. The conditions and proof are inspired by Arrow’s theorem.
Theorem 2.13 Let Assumptions 2.8 be satisﬁed. Assume there exist an α ∈ (0,1), a costate function
λ∗T
(t) : [0,T] → I Rn, u∗ and x∗ that satisfy (9-11). Introduce the Hamiltonian H(t,x,u,λ∗) :=
αg1+(1−α)g2+λ∗f. Assume that H(t,x,u,λ∗) has a minimum w.r.t. u for all x. Let H0(t,x,λ∗) :=
minu H(t,x,u,λ∗).
Then, if both Ho(t,x,λ∗) and h(x) := αh1(x) + (1 − α)h2(x) are convex in x, u∗ is Pareto eﬃcient.
Proof. Let α be as in Theorem 2.9 and J(u) := αJ1(u) + (1 − α)J2(u). Then,
J(u


















∗) + ˙ λ
∗(t)x
∗(t) − H(t,x,u,λ






where the last equality follows by integration by parts. From the convexity assumption on H0 and


























∗) + ˙ λ
∗(x − x
∗). (ii)
3Note that if Ui is convex also the Cartesian product U := U1 × U2 is a convex set.
9The last inequality is due to the fact that by deﬁnition of H0, H0(t,x,λ∗) ≤ H(t,x,u,λ∗) for every
choice of u.
On the other hand it follows from (10) and the convexity of h
h(x
∗(T)) − h(x(T)) + λ
∗(T)(x(T) − x
∗(T)) = h(x







From the inequalities (ii) and (iii) it is then obvious that J(u∗)−J(u) ≤ 0 in (i). So, αJ1+(1−α)J2
is minimized at u∗. So according to Lemma 2.1 u∗ is Pareto eﬃcient. ￿
Remark 2.14 For the constrained problem considered in Remark 2.11 the conditions (20-23) are
also suﬃcient to conclude that ˆ u is Pareto eﬃcient if h(x) is convex and either i) H0(x,λ,t) :=
min{u|mj(x,u)≤0} H(t,x,u,λ) (as deﬁned in Theorem 2.13) exists and is convex on the convex hull of
the set B := {x | for some u, mj(x,u) ≤ 0, j = 1,    ,k} or ii) the Hamiltonian H(t,x,u,λ∗) is
simultaneously convex in (x,u) and the constraints mj(x,u) are simultaneously (quasi-)convex in
(x,u). Details and extensions on this point can be found in [20, Chapter 4.3] or [21]. ￿
We illustrate some of the theory presented above in an example that was presented in [13, Example
3.5].
Example 2.15 Consider the following advertising game of two competing divisions in a conglom-
erate company which wish to maximize their individual proﬁts by choosing an optimal advertising
policy. Being divisions of a parent company, they are not out to ”hurt” each other; thus, a coopera-
tive game solution seems reasonable. With xi the gross revenue of the ith division and ui the rate of
expenditure for advertising it is assumed that the changes in the gross revenues are given by
˙ x1(t) = 12u1(t) − 2u
2
1(t) − x1(t) − u2(t) (24)
˙ x2(t) = 12u2(t) − 2u
2
2(t) − x2(t) − u1(t) (25)








xi(t) − ui(t)}dt, i = 1,2,
and these are to be maximized for both players.




− u1) − (1 − α)(
x2
3
− u2) + λ1(12u1 − 2u
2
1 − x1 − u2) + λ2(12u2 − 2u
2
2 − x2 − u1).
From Theorem 2.9 we conclude that every Pareto eﬃcient control ˆ u ≥ 0 satisﬁes for some α ∈ [0,1]
H(t, ˆ x(t), ˆ u(t),λ1(t),λ2(t)) ≤ H(t, ˆ x(t),u(t),λ1(t),λ2(t)), at each t ∈ [0,1], (26)
˙ λ1(t) = λ1(t) +
α
3
; λ1(1) = 0, (27)
˙ λ2(t) = λ2(t) +
1 − α
3
; λ2(1) = 0, (28)
10and the system equations (24,25).
It is straightforwardly veriﬁed that for α ∈ (0,1) we obtain the actions from which Leitmann showed
in [13, Example 3.5] that they are Pareto eﬃcient. That is:
if α > α1, ˆ u1 =
 
3
4(et−1 − 1)−1 + 3 − 1−α
4α for t ∈ [0,τ1]
0 for t ∈ (τ1,1]
if 0 < α ≤ α1, ˆ u1 = 0,
whereas
if 0 < α < α2, ˆ u2 =
  3
4(et−1 − 1)−1 + 3 − α
4(1−α) for t ∈ [0,τ2]
0 for t ∈ (τ2,1]
if α ≥ α2, ˆ u2 = 0.
Here α1 = 1/(3(e−1 − 1)−1 + 13), α2 = 1 − α1, τ1 = 1 + ln(1 + 3(1−α
α − 12)−1) and τ2 = 1 + ln(1 +
3( α
1−α − 12)−1).
On the other hand it is easily veriﬁed that if α = 0, λ1(t) = 0 and λ2(t) = 1−et−1
3 . So H is minimized
for ˆ u1(t) = 0 and ˆ u2(t) = max{0, 3
4(et−1 − 1)−1 + 3}. Obviously, the minimized Hamiltonian H0 is
linear in the state variables xi. So in particular H0 is a convex function of these variables. Therefore
we conclude from Theorem 2.13 that the case α = 0 yields an appropriate solution too. Similarly one
can also show that for α = 1 we obtain the Pareto eﬃcient solution ˆ u1(t) = max{0, 3
4(et−1−1)−1+3}
and ˆ u2(t) = 0. From Theorem 2.9 again we conclude ﬁnally that there are no additional Pareto
eﬃcient controls than those advertized here. ￿
3 The General Linear Quadratic Case


































≥ 0, i = 1,2, and x(t) is the
solution of the linear diﬀerential equation
˙ x(t) = Ax(t) + B1u1(t) + B2u2(t), x(0) = x0. (30)
Notice that we make no deﬁniteness assumptions w.r.t. matrix Qi. In this section we will assume
that the planning horizon, T, is ﬁnite.
For notational convenience we introduce for α ∈ [0,1] the next matrices and vectors M := αM1+(1−
α)M2, Q := αQ1+(1−α)Q2, R := αR1+(1−α)R2, V := αV1+(1−α)V2, W := αW1+(1−α)W2, QT :=
αQ1T+(1−α)Q2T, B := [B1 B2], uT := [uT
1 uT





















11For this special case Theorem 2.9 can be specialized as follows.

















˙ λ(t) = −2ˆ x






− λA; λ(T) = 2ˆ x
T(T)QT; (32)
˙ ˆ x(t) = Aˆ x(t) + Bˆ u(t), ˆ x(0) = x0. (33)
In case α is such that Ri > 0, i = 1,2, (i.e. Ri is positive deﬁnite), the above formulae can be




























In case R > 0, for all α ∈ [0,1], it follows directly from this Corollary 4.5 that (0,0) is the only
potential Pareto solution if x0 = 0. For in that case (x(.),λ(.)) = (0,0) always solves the above set
of diﬀerential equations (34).
Another property which readily follows from (34) is that if for some α for both the initial states x0
and x1 there exists a λi(t) satisfying (34) then also for every linear combination of x0 and x1 (34)
has a solution.
The above property hints to the property that if for both the initial states x0 and x1 there exists
a Pareto solution also for every linear combination of these initial states a Pareto solution will ex-
ist. Unfortunately this property does not hold in general, as will be demonstrated in Example 3.12.
However, the following linearity property does hold.
Lemma 3.2 Assume ˆ u is a Pareto eﬃcient control for (29,30). Then λˆ u is a Pareto eﬃcient
solution for (29,30) with x(0) = λx0.
Proof. Let x(t,x0,u) denote the solution of (30). Then elementary calculations show that x(t,λx0,λu) =
λx(t,x0,u) and, consequently, Ji(λx0,λu) = λ2Ji(x0,u).
From Lemma 2.2 we know that ˆ u is Pareto eﬃcient if and only if ˆ u minimizes Ji(x0,u) on the
constrained set
Ui(x0, ˆ u) := {u | Jj(x0,u) ≤ Jj(x0, ˆ u), j = 1,2, j  = i}, for i = 1,2. (35)
We will next show that λˆ u minimizes J1(λx0,u) on the constrained set
˜ U1 := {u | J2(λx0,u) ≤ J2(λx0,λˆ u)}. (36)
12Let u ∈ ˜ U1. Then according (36) J2(λx0,u) ≤ J2(λx0,λˆ u) or, equivalently, J2(x0, 1
λu) ≤ J2(x0, ˆ u).
So, by (35), 1
λu ∈ U1. But this implies that J1(x0, 1
λu) ≥ J1(x0, ˆ u) or, equivalently, J1(λx0,u) ≥
J1(λx0,λˆ u).
In a similar way one can show that λˆ u also minimizes J2(λx0,u) on the corresponding constrained
set ˜ U2, from which the claim is obvious then. ￿
It is well-known that existence of a solution of the linear quadratic control problem for an arbi-
trary initial state is equivalent to the existence of a solution of an associated Riccati equation. For
that reason we consider below the problem under which conditions for an arbitrary initial state
(29,30) has a Pareto solution. We have the following two preliminary results.





















Let [W1 W2] := [I 0]e−GT. Then, (37) has a solution for every x0 if and only if U := W1 + W2QT is
invertible.
Proof. Obviously, (37) has a solution for every x0 if and only if ∀x0 the following diﬀerential equation
has a solution





































































shows then that the above
equation is solvable if and only if matrix U is invertible. ￿
Whereas from [5, Corollary 5.13] we recall the following result.





. Consider the with G
corresponding Riccati diﬀerential equation
˙ K(t) = −A
TK(t) − K(t)A + (K(t)B + [V W])R
−1(K(t) + [V W]
T) − Q, K(T) = QT. (38)
Then, (38) has a solution on [0,T] if and only if U(t) is invertible on [0,T]. ￿
Remark 3.5 According to the fundamental existence-uniqueness theorem of diﬀerential equations
there exists a maximum time interval [0,T1) where equation (38) has a unique solution. So we con-
clude from 2.1 and [5, Theorem 5.1] that for a planning horizon T < T1 for every initial state x0 the
game has a Pareto solution. ￿
Using the above lemmas we obtain for the scalar case, that is the case that the dimension of the
state variable x(t) is one, the following result.
Theorem 3.6 Consider the scalar system with Ri > 0, i = 1,2. Let x0  = 0. Then,
1. if (29,30) has a Pareto eﬃcient control ˆ u(x0) there exists an α ∈ [0,1] such that minαJ1+(1−
α)J2 subject to (30) has a solution for all initial states x0 ∈ I R.
2. if Ji, i = 1,2, attains a minimum then
i) for all α ∈ [0,1], minαJ1 + (1 − α)J2 exists for all x0;
ii) all Pareto eﬃcient controls of (29,30) are given by {ˆ u | ˆ u = argminαJ1 + (1 − α)J2, α ∈
[0,1]}.
Proof. ”1.” Assume (J1(ˆ u),J2(ˆ u)) is a Pareto solution for problem (29,30) for some x0  = 0. Then,
according to Lemma 3.2, for every initial state problem (29,30) has a Pareto solution. Let x0  = 0
be ﬁxed and α, x(t) and λ(t) a with ˆ u(x0) corresponding solution that satisﬁes (34). Then it is
easily veriﬁed that for the initial state  x0, α,  x(t) and  λ(t) satisfy (34). In other words, for this





is invertible at t = 0.
Furthermore, by Corollary 4.5, ˆ u[t0,T] is Pareto eﬃcient for problem (29,30) if we consider Ji on
the interval [t0,T], instead of [0,T], with initial state x(t0) = eGt0x0. Again it is easily veriﬁed
that also in this case α, x(t) and λ(t) satisfy (34). So similar as before it follows that U(t0) is
invertible too. Since t0 ∈ [0,T] was chosen arbitrarily we conclude from Lemma 3.4 that the Riccati
diﬀerential equation (38) has a solution on [0,T]. But this implies (see e.g. [5, Theorem 5.1]) that
the optimization problem minαJ1 + (1 − α)J2 subject to (30) has a solution for all initial states x0.
It is easily veriﬁed that this solution is actually attained by ˆ u(x0).
”2.” Since Ji(λx0,λu) = λ2Ji(x0,u) and by assumption J1 and J2 have a minimum, it follows
immediately from Lemma 2.7 that for all α ∈ [0,1] there exists a ¯ J(x0,α) such that
αJ1(λx0,λu) + (1 − α)J2(λx0,λu) = λ
2(αJ1(x0,u) + (1 − α)J2(x0,u)) ≥ λ
2 ¯ J(x0,α).
From this it follows that for all α ∈ [0,1], for all x0 inf αJ1(x0,u) + (1 − α)J2(x0,u) exists. But this
implies (see e.g. [5, p.182,183]) that actually the optimization problem minαJ1 + (1 − α)J2 subject
14to (30) has a unique solution for all x0.
Part ii) follows directly from Part i) and Remark 2.6. ￿
Remark 3.7
1. As already noticed in the proof of Theorem 3.6.1 it follows directly from Lemma 3.2 that, in
case the scalar game has a Pareto solution for some initial state diﬀerent from zero, the game
(29,30) has a Pareto solution for every initial state.
2. From the proof of Theorem 3.6 we can in fact conclude the following result. If for x0  = 0
there exists a Pareto solution and for α0 ∈ [0,1] (34) has a solution with x(0) = x0, then
minα0J1 + (1 − α0)J2 subject to (30) has a solution for all initial states x0 ∈ I R.
3. The assumption that the minimum of Ji exists in Theorem 3.6.2 implies that Ji is convex (see
[7, Theorems 2.8, 2.9]). Therefore, this part of the theorem is a special case of those dealt with
in Section 4. ￿
The next example illustrates some of the subtleties of Theorem 3.6.






2}dt subject to ˙ x = u, x(0) = x0, i = 1,2.
First consider the minimization of
J1 subject to ˙ x = u, x(0) = x0. (39)
In case β1 = 1, it is well-known (see e.g. [5, Example 5.1]) that this problem (39) has a solution if
and only if x0 = 0. In case x0 = 0, u(.) = γ cos(t) yields for every γ the optimal value 0.
Furthermore, if β1 > 1, the with this problem corresponding Riccati diﬀerential equation (38),
˙ k(t) = 1
β1k2(t) + 1; k(π
2) = 0, has a solution on [0, π
2]. So in that case problem (39) has for every
initial state x0 a solution.
Finally, in case β1 < 1 one can use e.g. the control sequence from [3, Remark 3.1.4] (which was used
to show that for β1 = 1 this example has no solution in case x0  = 0) to construct also for x0 = 0
a control sequence for which J1 becomes negative (implying that inf J1 does not exist), yielding the
conclusion that for β1 < 1 for all initial states problem (39) has no solution.
Next we consider a consequence of these conclusions for cooperative games in relationship with
Theorem 3.6.
Consider the case βi = 1, i = 1,2. Then, obviously, for every α ∈ [0,1] αJ1 + (1 − α)J2 = J1. From
the above consideration we have that for all x0  = 0, for all α ∈ [0,1], this problem has no solution.
So from Theorem 3.6.1 we conclude that this cooperative game has no Pareto solution if x0  = 0. On
the other hand we conclude from Lemma 2.1 and the above considerations that for x0 = 0 there does
exist a Pareto solution, i.e. (0,0). ￿
15A direct consequence of the above Theorem 3.6 is the following theorem.
Theorem 3.9 Consider the scalar system with Ri > 0, i = 1,2. Then for every x0 (29,30) has a
Pareto eﬃcient control ˆ u(x0) if and only if there exists an α ∈ [0,1] such that for every x0 minαJ1+
(1 − α)J2 subject to (30) has a solution.
Proof. ” ⇒ ” In particular it follows that (29,30) has a Pareto eﬃcient solution for some x0  = 0.
Theorem 3.6 yields then the advertized result.
” ⇐ ” Since the minimum exists for all x0 it is well-known that the argument at which this minimum
is attained is unique (see e.g. [5, Theorem 5.1]). Consequently Remark 2.6 yields then directly the
conclusion. ￿
Using Theorem 3.9 we arrive then at the next procedure to ﬁnd all Pareto eﬃcient solutions for
the scalar game.
Algorithm 3.10 Using the notation introduced in the beginning of this section, consider the scalar
system with Ri > 0, i = 1,2.
Let ˆ U be the set of all Pareto eﬃcient controls for which for every x0 (29,30) has a Pareto solution.
Next consider the Riccati diﬀerential equation
˙ K(t) = −A
TK(t) − K(t)A + (K(t)B + [V (α) W(α)])R
−1(α)(B
TK(t) + [V (α) W(α)]
T) − Q(α),
K(T) = QT(α). (40)
Then all Pareto eﬃcient controls ˆ u(α) ∈ ˆ U are obtained by determining all α ∈ [0,1] for which (40)
has a solution Kα(t) on [0,T]. More in particular, if (40) has a solution Kα(t) on [0,T] then




where ˆ x(t) solves the diﬀerential equation ˙ x(t) = (A−BR−1(α)([V (α) W(α)]T+BTKα(t))x(t), x(0) =
x0, yields a Pareto eﬃcient control. The corresponding Pareto solution is obtained by determining
(J1(ˆ u(α)),J2(ˆ u(α))). ￿




































(u1 + u2), x(0) = x0.
Here player i controls ui. According to Algorithm 3.10 this game has for every initial state a Pareto
eﬃcient solution precisely for those α ∈ [0,1] for which the following Riccati diﬀerential equation has
a solution on [0, π
2]:
˙ k = sk
2 + 1, k(
π
2
) = 0, where s :=
16
(1 + 8α)(9 − 8α)
.








s < 1. It is easily veriﬁed that this is equivalent to the condition α ∈ (1
8, 7
8).
So, the set of all Pareto eﬃcient controls is given by













where ˆ x(t) solves ˙ x(t) = −sk(t)x(t), x(0) = x0, and α ∈ (1
8, 7
8).
To complete the picture we will ﬁnally analyze the case α ∈ I := [0, 1
8] ∪ [7
8,1]. From Remark 3.7.2
and Theorem 3.9 it follows that for all α ∈ I there does not exist a x0  = 0 such that the game has
a Pareto solution for this initial state. So, only for x0 = 0 for these α ∈ I an additional Pareto
solution might occur. However, as already noticed directly after Corollary 4.5, this leads to the only
candidate control (0,0), from which we know already that it is Pareto eﬃcient. ￿
The following example illustrates a two-dimensional state game where for all initial states in the
interior of the second and fourth quadrant and the point (0,0) a Pareto solution exists whereas for
all other initial states there exists no Pareto solution.























˙ x1 = u, x1(0) = p, ˙ x2 = u, x2(0) = q.
Next consider the minimization of







−3 + 2α 2 − α
















From the above set of state diﬀerential equations it follows directly that x1(t) = x2(t) + p − q.
Substitution of this into (41) shows that the minimization of (41) subject to (42) is equivalent to the
minimization of




{−(x2(t) + (1 − α)(p − q))
2 + u




˙ x2(t) = u(t); x2(0) = q. (44)
17From Example 3.8 it follows that this problem has a solution if and only if the initial state satisﬁes
−(1 − α)(p − q) = q or, equivalently, (1 − α)p = −αq. From this it is easily veriﬁed that for every
initial state (p,q) of (42) there is exact one α ∈ [0,1] such that the minimization of (41) has a
solution if (p,q) is located either in the second quadrant, the fourth quadrant, on the line p = 0
(which corresponds with α = 0) or on the line q = 0 (which corresponds with α = 1). So we conclude
from Lemma 2.1 that for all the initial states (p,q) which are located in the interior of the second
and fourth quadrant there is a Pareto solution.



















From Example 3.8 we recall again that the minimum value of J1 is 0. Furthermore, u2(t) := γ cos(t)
belongs to the with this problem corresponding constrained set U2 (see Lemma 2.2). Using this























Since γ is an arbitrary number it is clear from this that minu∈U2 J2 does not exist if p  = 0. So, by
Lemma 2.2, for the initial state (p,0), there exists no Pareto eﬃcient solution. Similarly it follows
that also for the initial state (0,q) the problem has no Pareto eﬃcient solution. Finally, it is easily
veriﬁed that for the initial state (0,0), for every γ, ˆ u = γ cos(t) is a Pareto eﬃcient control yielding
the same Pareto solution (0,0).
Obviously, the with problem (41,42) corresponding Riccati diﬀerential equation has for every α ∈









from (34). It is easily veriﬁed that
G = SJS








0 1/α 0 1−α
2−α2
1−α
α 0 −1 0









0 1 0 0
−1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1





So for the initial state x0 = [p; q]T there exists an α ∈ [0,1], x(.), and λ(.) satisfying (34) if and only
if there exists an α ∈ [0,1] and ¯ λ1, ¯ λ2 such that the equation
e
G π









18has a solution. An elementary spelling of these equations shows that there exists a solution if and
only if p(1 − α) = −αq. So, in particular we conclude from this that for all initial states located in
either the interior of the ﬁrst or third quadrant there exists no Pareto solution. ￿
4 The Convex Linear Quadratic Case
Inspired by the results of Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.12 we consider in this section in detail the case
when the linear quadratic cost functions are convex. The performance criteria of the players is again
given by (29). An additional assumption will be that Ri > 0 throughout this section. On the other
hand we consider in this section a slightly more general system, i.e.
˙ x(t) = Ax(t) + B1u1(t) + B2u2(t) + c(t), x(0) = x0. (45)
The variable c(.) ∈ L2 is some given trajectory. The planning horizon, T, may be either ﬁnite or
inﬁnite.
Note, that whenever Ji are convex also
 N
i=1 αiJi(γ) is convex for an arbitrary α ∈ A.
Next we consider some sets of control functions that are relevant in our problem setting. It can be
easily shown that each of these (nonempty4) sets is convex.
Lemma 4.1 Let U be given by either:
1) L2[0,T] := {(u1,u2) | ui(.) are square integrable functions on [0,T]}.
2) {u ∈ L2[0,T] | x(0) = x(T) = 0 in ˙ x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t)}.
3) L
+
2,e := {(u1,u2) | ui(.) ∈ L2,loc and limT→∞ Ji(x0,u) exists in I R ∪ {−∞,∞},∀x0}, where L2,loc
is the set of locally square-integrable functions, i.e.,







2,e,s := {(u1,u2) | (u1,u2) ∈ L
+
2,e and limt→∞ x(t) = 0 in (45)}.
Then each of these set of control functions is convex. ￿
Next we consider the question under which conditions the cost functions Ji in (29) are convex. To
that end we ﬁrst derive some preliminary results.




















+ c2(t)}dt + x
T(T)QTx(T)(46)
subject to the state dynamics
˙ x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + c1(t), x(s) = x0, (47)
4assuming for case 2) and 3) that (A,[B1 B2]) is stabilizable



















T(T)QTz(T) with ˙ z(t) = Az(t) + Bv(t), z(s) = 0.(48)
Proof: Let xu(t) denote the state trajectory of (47) in case the control u(.) is used. Then it is
well-known that due to the linearity of the system
xλu+(1−λ)w(t) = λxu(t) + (1 − λ)xw(t). (49)































































u(T)QTxu(T) + (1 − λ)x
T
w(T)QTxw(T).


























˙ xu(t) = Axu(t) + Bu(t) + c(t), xu(0) = x0 and ˙ xw(t) = Axw(t) + Bw(t) + c(t), xw(0) = x0.
With z := xu − xw and v := u − w the stated result then follows immediately. ￿
Remark 4.3
1. Note that the second part of the equivalence does not depend on x0. In particular it follows
from this that if J is convex for one x0 then J is convex for all x0. This property can also be
veriﬁed by a direct elaboration of the convexity deﬁnition using the linearity property of the
system again.






































Then it follows immediately from Lemma 4.2 that J is convex if and only if the controllable
part of this system is convex. That is if, with










J1 is convex. ￿
Lemma 4.4 Assume U is convex. Consider the linear quadratic cost function (46) and (47). Then,
if J(0,T,u,x0) is convex for some x0, J(s,T,u,x0) is convex for all s ≥ 0 and for all x0.
Proof: Let s > 0. Let ui(t) = v(t) + wi(t), where v(t) = 0, t ≥ s and wi(t) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ s. Then,
J(0,T,ui,x0) = J(0,s,v,x0) + J(s,T,wi,x(s,x0)). (50)
Since J(0,T,u,x0) is convex, by deﬁnition, for an arbitrary u and w and λ ∈ (0,1)
J(0,T,λu + (1 − λ)w,x0) ≤ λJ(0,T,u,x0) + (1 − λ)J(0,T,w,x0). (51)
So in particular if we choose u = u1 and w = u2 as above we get, using (50),
J(0,s,v,x0) + J(s,T,λw1 + (1 − λ)w2,x(s,x0)) = J(0,T,λu1 + (1 − λ)u2,x0)
≤ λJ(0,T,u1,x0) + (1 − λ)J(0,T,u2,x0)
= λ(J(0,s,v,x0) + J(s,T,w1,x(s,x0))) + (1 − λ)(J(0,s,v,x0) + J(s,T,w2,x(s,x0)))
= J(0,s,v,x0) + λJ(s,T,w1,x(s,x0))) + (1 − λ)J(s,T,w2,x(s,x0)).
Comparing both sides of this inequality shows then that J(s,T,w,x(s,x0)) is convex. The rest of
the statement follows then directly from Remark 4.3, item 1. ￿
Corollary 4.5 Consider the linear quadratic cost function (46) and (47). Then, J(s,T,u,x0) is
convex for all s ≥ 0 and x0 if and only if J(0,T,u,x0) is convex for all/an x0, which holds if and
only if ¯ J(0,T,v,0) ≥ 0 for all v, where ¯ J is given by (48). ￿
Theorem 4.6 Assume either T is ﬁnite or (A,B) is stabilizable. Then J(0,T,u,x0) is convex for
all/an x0 if and only if inf ¯ J(0,T,v,0) exists.
21Proof:
” ⇒ ” From Corollary 4.5 it follows that if J(0,T,u,x0) is convex ¯ J(0,T,v,0) ≥ 0 for all v. In case T
is ﬁnite obviously inf ¯ J(0,T,v,0) ≤ J(0,T,0,0) whereas in case (A,B) is stabilizable, inf ¯ J(0,∞,v,0)
is bounded from above too. Consequently, inf ¯ J(0,T,v,0) exists.
” ⇐ ” Assume inf ¯ J(0,T,v,0) = m. Then m ≥ 0. For if m < 0 there would exist a ¯ v such
that ¯ J(0,T,¯ v,0) < 0. But from this it follows directly from the linearity of the system that
¯ J(0,T,λ¯ v,0) = λ2 ¯ J(0,T,¯ v,0). From which it is clear that inf ¯ J(0,T,v,0) would not exist. So
¯ J(0,T,v,0) ≥ 0 for all v. This implies, see Corollary 4.5 again, that J(0,T,u,x0) is convex for all/an
x0. ￿
Next we consider the case R > 0 in M. It is well-known that then the next Riccati equations
play an important role
˙ K(t) = A
TK(t) + K(t)A − (K(t)B + V )R
−1(B
TK(t) + V
T) + Q, K(T) = QT; (DRE)
0 = A
TK + KA − (KB + V )R
−1(B
TK + V
T) + Q. (ARE)
Let Γ denote the set of all symmetric solutions of (ARE). From, e.g., [5] and [27] (see also [18], [11],
[30], [14] [15] and [28]) we recall the next results. Notice that these results are formulated in terms of
existence of the performance function for an arbitrary initial state. In the above cited references one
can also ﬁnd conditions for the existence of inf ¯ J(0,T,v,0). Since the formulation of these conditions
is more involved and is somewhat outside the main scope of this note they are not presented here.












T(T)QTx(T) with ˙ x(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t), x(0) = x0. (52)
Then the following holds:
1. Let T < ∞ and U = L2[0,T]. Then, infu J exists for all x0 if and only if (DRE) has a solution
on [0,T]. Moreover, if this inﬁmum exists it is in fact a minimum. This minu J(u) = xT
0 K(0)x0
is attained uniquely by u∗(t) = −R−1(BTK(t) + V )x∗(t), where K(t) is the unique symmetric
solution of (DRE) and x∗(.) solves ˙ x(t) = (A − BR−1(BTK(t) + V ))x(t), x∗(0) = x0.
2. Let T = ∞, U = L
+
2,e,s and (A,B) be stabilizable. Then, infu J exists for all x0 if and only
if Γ  = ∅. Moreover, there exists a u∗ attaining this inﬁmum if and only if (ARE) has a
stabilizing solution K+. Under this condition minu J(u) = xT
0 K+x0 is attained uniquely by
u∗(t) = −R−1(BTK++V )x∗(t), where x∗(.) solves ˙ x(t) = (A−BR−1(BTK++V ))x(t), x∗(0) =
x0.
3. Let QT = 0, T = ∞, U = L
+
2,e and (A,B) be controllable. Then, infu J exists for all x0
if (ARE) has a symmetric solution K ≤ 0. Moreover, if this condition is satisﬁed there ex-
ists a u∗ attaining this inﬁmum if and only if ∆ ⊂ K−. Here K− is the smallest solution
of Γ and ∆ := K+ − K−, where K+ is the largest solution of Γ. In that case minu J(u) =
xT
0 Kfx0 is attained uniquely by u∗(t) = −R−1(BTKf + V )x∗(t), where x∗(.) solves ˙ x(t) =
(A − BR−1(BTKf + V ))x(t), x∗(0) = x0 and Kf = K−PN + K+(I − PN). Here PN is the
22projector onto the subspace N along ∆−1N⊥ with N the undetectable (w.r.t. l C−∪ l C0) subspace
of (K−,(A − BR−1(BTK− + V ))). ￿
Remark 4.8 If (ARE) has a solution K ≥ 0 then Kf in Theorem 4.7.3) is the smallest positive
semi-deﬁnite solution of (ARE).
If one merely assumes (A,B) to be stabilizable instead of controllable in Theorem 4.7.3) (ARE)
has in general not a smallest solution anymore. It can still be shown under the same condition as in
3) (that (ARE) has a solution K ≤ 0) that the inﬁmum exists and equals xT
0Kfx0 for some Kf ∈ Γ.
However there does not exist a nice characterization like in 3) of Kf (see [10]). ￿
Next introduce B := [B1 B2]. Combining the results of Lemmas 2.1, 2.12 and Theorems 4.6, 4.7
one can derive now straightforwardly existence and computational algorithms for both the ﬁnite and
inﬁnite horizon game problems. We will just state the result for the inﬁnite planning horizon case
where the state converges to zero. The formulation of the other results is left to the reader.
Corollary 4.9 Consider the cooperative game (29,45) with T = ∞, U = L
+
2,e,s and (A,B) stabiliz-
able.






has a stabilizing5 solution Ki, for i = 1,2,
respectively.




α1J1 + α2J2, subject to (45). (53)




Notice that, since by assumption both cost functions are strict convex, the minimization problem
(53) has for all α ∈ A a unique solution. From this result one obtains then the next procedure to
calculate all Pareto eﬃcient outcomes for this game.
Theorem 4.10 (Solution Cooperative Game)
Consider the cooperative game (29,45) with T = ∞, U = L
+
2,e,s and (A,B) stabilizable.
For α ∈ A let
M(α) := α1M1 + α2M2 =:
  ˜ Q ˜ V

















5That is, σ(A − BR−1V T − SKi) ⊂ l C−.
23Furthermore, let ˜ S := B ˜ R−1BT.
Assume that (54) below has a stabilizing solution Xi for αi = 1, i = 1,2, respectively.
A
TX + XA − (XB + ˜ V ) ˜ R
−1(B
TX + ˜ V
T) + ˜ Q = 0. (54)
Then the set of all cooperative Pareto solutions is given by
{(J1(u
∗(α)),J2(u
∗(α))) | α ∈ A}.
Here
u
∗(t) = − ˜ R
−1(B
TXs + ˜ V








where Xs is the stabilizing solution of (54) and, with Acl := A−B ˜ R−1˜ V T−˜ SXs, the closed-loop system
is ˙ x(t) = Aclx(t) − Sm(t) + c(t), x(0) = x0. In case c(.) = 0 the with these actions corresponding
cost are Ji(x0,u∗) = xT
0 ˜ Mix0, where ˜ Mi is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation
A
T




− ˜ R−1(BTXs + ˜ V T)
 
. ￿
Example 4.11 To illustrate the above result consider the next simplistic environmental example.
Consider a ﬁshery management game, where two industries pollute a lake and their income depends
on the ﬁsh-stock of the lake. Assume that both the revenues and cost depend quadratically on the
ﬁsh-stock and the produced pollution. Within this context we consider the next model:



















Here x describes the ﬁsh-stock and ui is the pollution produced by industry i. The fact that industry
1 gives more weight to the pollution it produces than to the quantity produced by the other industry
can be interpreted as that industry 1 is really concerned about the pollution it produces itself (and
which it is able to control in contrast to the pollution produced by the other industry). In ﬁgure 1
we plotted the with this problem corresponding Pareto frontier if both players would cooperate in
this game. ￿
5 The Cooperative Game
As we motivated in the introduction the set of Pareto solution(s) constitute a natural set of outcomes
to consider when players cooperate. As we illustrated in the previous sections in a number of examples
in a two-player game usually the Pareto frontier will be a one-dimensional surface in I R2. However,
this does not always have to be the case. This can, e.g., already be illustrated by a simple two-player







Figure 1: Pareto frontier Example 4.11.
scalar linear quadratic game. Assuming both players have the same cost function (with positive
weights) it is easily veriﬁed that in that case the Pareto frontier reduces to a single point in I R2.
Assuming that in a cooperative setting more than one solution exists, a natural question that arises is
which solution of all these possibilities will be chosen by the players. Since we assume an open-loop
information structure of the game we can use concepts developed within the area of static game
theory to motivate the choice for a certain solution. Within the area of static cooperative game
theory one usually distinguishes two types of games: the transferable utility (TU) games and the
nontransferable utility (NTU) games6.
By working together in coalitions, players can generate beneﬁts. A typical example is that of a
number of ﬁrms cooperating in order to save costs. Not only is it interesting to know how players
can cooperate in an optimal way, but also the problem of allocation arises. TU-games were introduced
by [29] and can be seen as an allocation problem in which an amount of money is to be divided and
can be freely transferred between the players. Here one abstracts from the fact that the involved
players may value the obtained payoﬀs diﬀerently.
Generally, the analysis of a TU-game focuses on how to allocate the joint beneﬁts/costs of the grand
coalition of all players, where the values of subcoalitions serve as a benchmark. In order to allocate
the value of the grand coalition several one-point solutions, each with its own appealing properties,
have been proposed in the literature. As examples we mention the Shapley value [23], the compromise
value [26] and the nucleolus [19]. An important concept in the allocation of the value of a grand
coalition is core stability. The core of a (N)TU-game consists of those allocation vectors such that
no subcoalition has an incentive to splitt oﬀ. Hence, if the TU-game measures the beneﬁts of each
coalition, an allocation is an element of the core if for each coalition its members receive together at
least as much as they could achieve when they would act as a separate coalition.
NTU games, introduced by [2], on the other hand assume that there is no common measure of
utility. That is, the objects to be divided are not valued in the same way by all the players. Conse-
quently, no side-payments take place. Within the NTU-games one discerns the so-called bargaining
problems. For these games one assumes that only the set of feasible outcomes for the individual
players and a so-called threatpoint is speciﬁed. This threatpoint (or disagreement point) is a value
every individual player can obtain by playing noncooperatively. Below we will elaborate three bar-
gaining solutions which have been proposed in literature.
Bargaining theory has its origin in two papers by Nash [16] and [17]. In these papers a bargaining





Figure 2: The bargaining game.
problem is deﬁned as a situation in which two (or more) individuals or organizations have to agree
on the choice of one speciﬁc alternative from a set of alternatives available to them, while having
conﬂicting interests over this set of alternatives. Nash proposes in [17] two diﬀerent approaches to the
bargaining problem, namely the axiomatic and the strategic approach. The axiomatic approach lists
a number of desirable properties the solution must have, called the axioms. The strategic approach
on the other hand, sets out a particular bargaining procedure and asks what outcomes would result
from rational behavior by the individual players.
So, bargaining theory deals with the situation in which players can realize -through cooperation-
other (and better) outcomes than the one which becomes eﬀective when they do not cooperate. This
non-cooperative outcome is called the threatpoint. The question is to which outcome the players may
possibly agree.
In Figure 2 a typical bargaining game is sketched (see also Figure 1). The inner part of the
ellipsoid marks out the set of possible outcomes, the feasible set S, of the game. The point d is the
threatpoint. The edge P is the set of individually rational Pareto-optimal outcomes.
We assume that if the agents unanimously agree on a point x = (J1,J2) ∈ S, they obtain x.
Otherwise they obtain d. This presupposes that each player can enforce the threatpoint, when he
does not agree with a proposal. The outcome x the players will ﬁnally agree on is called the solution
of the bargaining problem. Since the solution depends on as well the feasible set S as the threatpoint
d, it will be written as F(S,d). Notice that the diﬀerence for player i between the solution and the
threatpoint, Ji − di, is the reduction in cost player i incurs by accepting the solution. In the sequel
we will call this diﬀerence the utility gain for player i. We will use the notation J := (J1,J2) to
denote a point in S and x ≻ y(x ≺ y) to denote the vector inequality, i.e. xi > yi(xi < yi), i = 1,2.
In axiomatic bargaining theory a number of solutions have been proposed. In Thomson [25] a survey
is given on this theory. We will present here the three most commonly used solutions: the Nash
bargainig solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Egalitarian solution.
The Nash bargaining solution, N(S,d), selects the point of S at which the product of utility gains





(Ji − di), for J ∈ S with J   d.







Figure 3: The Nash Bargaining solution N(S,d).
the edge of S (that is a part of the Pareto frontier) which yields the largest rectangle (N,A,B,d).
The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, K(S,d), sets utility gains from the threatpoint proportional to
the player’s most optimistic expectations. For each agent, the most optimistic expectation is deﬁned
as the lowest cost he can attain in the feasible set subject to the constraint that no agent incurs a
cost higher than his coordinate of the threatpoint. Deﬁning the ideal point as
I(S,d) := max{Ji | J ∈ S, J   d},
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is then
K(S,d) := maximal point of S on the segment connecting d to I(S,d).
In Figure 4 the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution is sketched for the two-player case. Geometrically, it is
the intersection of the Pareto frontier P with the line which connects the threatpoint and the ideal
point. The components of the ideal point are the minima each player can reach when the other player
is fully altruistic under cooperation.
Finally, the Egalitarian solution, E(S,d), represents the idea that gains should be equal divided
between the players. Formal,
E(S,d) := maximal point in S for which Ei(S,d) − di = Ej(S,d) − dj, i,j = 1,    ,N.
Again, we sketched this solution for the two-player case. In Figure 5 we observe that geometrically
this Egalitarian solution is obtained as the intersection point of the 45o-line through the threatpoint
d with the Pareto frontier P.
Notice that in particular in contexts where interpersonal comparisons of utility is inappropriate
or impossible, the ﬁrst two bargaining solutions still make sense.
As already mentioned above these bargaining solutions can be motivated using an ”axiomatic
approach”. In this case some people prefer to speak of an arbitration scheme instead of a bargaining













Figure 5: The Egalitarian solution E(S,d).
28Algorithms to calculate the ﬁrst two solutions numerically are outlined in [5]. The calculation
of the Egalitarian solution requires the solution of one non-linear constrained equations problem.
The involved computer time to calculate this E-solution approximately equals that of calculating
the N-solution.
Example 5.1 Consider the following diﬀerential game on government debt stabilization (see van
Aarle et al. [1]). Assume that government debt accumulation, ˙ d(t), is the sum of interest payments
on government debt, rd(t), and primary ﬁscal deﬁcits, f(t), minus the seignorage (i.e. the issue of
base money) m(t). So,
˙ d(t) = rd(t) + f(t) − m(t),d(0) = d0.
Here d(t), f(t) and m(t) are expressed as fractions of GDP and r represents the rate of interest on
outstanding government debt minus the growth rate of output. The interest rate r > 0 is assumed
to be exogenous. Assume that ﬁscal and monetary policies are controlled by diﬀerent institutions,
the ﬁscal authority and the monetary authority, respectively, which have diﬀerent objectives. The
objective of the ﬁscal authority is to minimize a sum of time proﬁles of the primary ﬁscal deﬁcit,









The parameters, η and λ express the relative priority attached to base-money growth and government
debt by the ﬁscal authority. The monetary authorities are assumed to choose the growth of base
money such that a sum of time proﬁles of base-money growth and government debt is minimized. It









Here 1/κ can be interpreted as a measure for the conservatism of the central bank w.r.t. the money
growth and ǫ is almost zero. Furthermore all variables are normalized such that their targets are
zero, and all parameters are positive.
Introducing ˜ d(t) := e− 1
2δtd(t), ˜ m := e− 1
2δtm(t) and ˜ f := e− 1
2δtf(t) the above model can be rewritten
as
˙ ˜ d(t) = (r −
1
2
δ)˜ d(t) + ˜ f(t) − ˜ m(t), ˜ d(0) = d0.





2(t) + η ˜ m







2(t) + ˜ m
2(t) + κ˜ d
2(t)}dt.
29If both the monetary and ﬁscal authority agree to cooperate in order to reach their goals, by Theorem
2.12 the set of all Pareto solutions is obtained by considering the simultaneous minimization of





2(t) + β1 ˜ m
2(t) + β2 ˜ d
2(t)}dt,
where α1 = ǫ+α(1−ǫ), β1 = 1+α(−1+η) and β2 = κ+α(λ−κ). This cooperative game problem














˙ ˜ d(t) = (r −
1
2
δ)˜ d(t) + [1 − 1]
  ˜ f
˜ m
 
, ˜ d(0) = d0.
In Figure 5 we plotted the set of Pareto solutions in case η = 0.1; λ = 0.6; ǫ = 0.00001; κ = 0.5; r =
0.06, δ = 0.04 and d(0) = 1. Furthermore we plotted the corresponding N, K and E solution if the
threatpoint is (2,1). For these parameters we also calculated the corresponding non-cooperative open-
loop Nash equilibrium (see e.g. [5, Section 7.7]). This solution is given by (J1,J2) = (0.4658,0.7056).
Taking this as the threatpoint, we illustrated in Figure 5 the new (more realistic) bargaining solutions.
Furthermore we tabulated in Table 1 below the percentage gains for the ﬁscal and monetary authority
if they would cooperate instead of playing non-cooperative. Assuming that real society’s cost are
measured by the average of the cost of the ﬁscal and monetary authority we observe from Table 1
that cooperation leads to a reduction of society’s cost with approximately 30%.
Solution Coordinates % gain J1 % gain J2
N (0.3383,0.471) 27.4 33.2
K (0.3445,0.4582) 26.0 35.1
E (0.3755,0.42) 19.4 40.5
Table 1: Percentage gains of cooperation
￿
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we considered both necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a Pareto
solution in a cooperative dynamic diﬀerential game with an open-loop information structure. This
problem setting naturally occurs if either one person has more than one objectives he likes to optimize,
or, the dynamics of the considered system is aﬀected by more than one person and these persons
agree to cooperate in order to optimize their individual objective.













Figure 6: Pareto frontier Example 5.1 if η = 0.1; λ = 0.6; κ = 0.5; r = 0.06 and δ = 0.04.













Figure 7: Bargaining solutions Example 5.1 if threatpoint is (0.4658,0.7056).
31The presented necessary condition is a mixture of the maximum principle conditions and the nec-
essary conditions for existence of a Pareto solution in a static game. In line with Arrow’s conditions,
we also gave conditions under which the necessary conditions are suﬃcient too. Finally we indicated
the eﬀects on the necessary conditions if the problem setting includes inequality constraints.
In the second part of this paper we considered the special case of regular indeﬁnite linear quadratic
control problems. First we elaborated the necessary conditions for the general case and next we
considered the special case when the game is convex.
For the general case we showed how one can obtain all Pareto eﬃcient outcomes for scalar systems if
the game has Pareto solutions for every initial state. Unfortunately, the generalization of these results
to non-scalar systems remains an open problem. We illustrated in an example some pecularities that
may occur.
For the convex game we showed how one can obtain all Pareto eﬃcient outcomes. Using the
theory of convex analysis we were able to treat both the ﬁnite and inﬁnite planning horizon problems
in a uniform way. For the inﬁnite planning horizon we considered both the ﬁxed endpoint problem
and the free endpoint problem.
We believe that without too many complications the presented theory on the general case can
be extended for an inﬁnite planning horizon. The elaboration of the herewith involved technical
problems remains however a point for future research. Another open problem that remains to be
solved within this area is the case that the performance criteria of both players are not directly
aﬀected by the control eﬀorts used by the other player (giving rise to singular control problems).
Open problems that remain to be solved for the convex case are, e.g., the free endpoint inﬁnite
planning horizon problem under the assumption that the system is merely stabilizable.
Finally, in the third part of this paper, we considered the question which cooperative solution will
result in a multi-player context. Given our open-loop information structure we argued that it makes
sense to use solution concepts developed in static game theory to answer this question. In particular
we reviewed some axiomatic bargaining solutions which have been developed for non-transferable
utility games. We illustrated them in an example.
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